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Abstract—Greybox fuzzing has been the most scalable and
practical approach to software testing. Most greybox fuzzing tools
are coverage guided as code coverage is strongly correlated with
bug coverage. However, since most covered codes may not contain
bugs, blindly extending code coverage is less efficient, especially
for corner cases. Unlike coverage-based fuzzers who extend the
code coverage in an undirected manner, a directed fuzzer spends
most of its time budget on reaching specific target locations (e.g.,
the bug-prone zone) without wasting resources stressing unrelated
parts. Thus, directed greybox fuzzing is particularly suitable for
scenarios such as patch testing, bug reproduction, and special
bug hunting. In this paper, we conduct the first in-depth study
of directed greybox fuzzing. We investigate 26 state-of-the-art
fuzzers (80% are published after 2019) closely related to DGF,
which have various directed types and optimization techniques.
Based on the feature of DGF, we extract 15 metrics to conduct
a thorough assessment of the collected tools and systemize the
knowledge of this field. Finally, we summarize the challenges and
provide perspectives of this field, aiming to facilitate and boost
future research on this topic.
I. Introduction
To date, the most scalable and practical approach to software
testing has been greybox fuzzing, which draws much attention
in recent years [1–4]. Compared to blackbox fuzzing and
whitebox fuzzing, greybox fuzzing is efficient and effective.
Based on the feedback information from the execution, grey-
box fuzzers use an evolutionary algorithm to generate new
input and explore the paths. Greybox fuzzing is widely used
to testing application software, libraries [5], as well as kernel
code [6–8], and has been applied in practice to varieties of
targets, including protocols [9, 10], smart contracts [11, 12],
and multi-threaded programs [13–15].
Most greybox fuzzing tools are coverage guided, which aim
to cover as many program paths as possible within a limited
time budget. This is because, intuitionally, code coverage
is strongly correlated with bug coverage, and fuzzers with
higher code coverage can find more bugs. However, it is not
appropriate to treat all codes of the program as equal because
most covered codes may not contain bugs. For example,
according to Shin et al. [16], only 3% of the source code
files in Mozilla Firefox have vulnerabilities. Thus, testing
software by blindly extending code coverage is less efficient,
especially for corner cases. Since achieving full code coverage
is difficult in practice, researchers have been trying to target
the vulnerable parts in the code to improve efficiency and save
the resources. Thus, directed fuzzing is proposed.
Unlike coverage-based fuzzers who are blindly extending
the path coverage, a directed fuzzer spends most of its time
budget on reaching specific target locations (e.g., the bug-
prone zone) without wasting resources stressing unrelated
parts. Thus, directed greybox fuzzing is particularly suitable
for scenarios such as patch testing, bug reproduction, and
integration with other tools. Traditionally, directed fuzzers are
based on symbolic execution [17–20], which uses program
analysis and constraint solving to generate inputs that exercise
different program paths. Such directed fuzzers cast the reacha-
bility problem as iterative constraint satisfaction problem [21].
However, since directed symbolic execution relies on heavy-
weight program analysis and constraint solving, it suffers from
scalability and compatibility limitations.
In 2017, Bo¨hme et al. introduced the concept of Directed
Greybox Fuzzing (DGF)[21]. By specifying a set of target sites
in the program under test (PUT) and leveraging lightweight
compile-time instrumentation of the PUT, a directed greybox
fuzzer calculates the distance between the seed and the target
to assist seed selection. By giving more mutation chances to
the seeds that are closer to the target, it can steer the greybox
fuzzing to reach the target locations. DGF casts reachability
as an optimization problem to minimize the distance of the
generated seeds to the targets [21]. Compared with directed
symbolic execution, DGF has much better scalability and
improves the efficiency of several magnitudes. For example,
Bo¨hme et al can reproduce Heartbleed within 20 minutes
while the directed symbolic execution tool KATCH [20] needs
more than 24 hours [21]. For now, DGF has been studied
in-depth and has evolved beyond the primary pattern that
depends on manually labeled target sites and distance-based
metrics to prioritize the seeds. A great number of variations
have been realized to boost software testing under different
scenarios, such as fuzzers directed by target sequence [22–24],
by semantic information [25, 26], by parser [27], by typestate
[28], by sanitizer checks [29, 30], by memory usage [31],
and by vulnerable probability [32]. Complex deep behavioral
testing scenes, such as use-after-free bugs [22, 28], memory
consumption bugs [31], memory violation bugs [33], algo-
rithmic complexity vulnerabilities [5], input validation bugs
in robotic vehicles [34], even the state space of the game
Super Mario Bros [35], can be handled via optimized directed
greybox fuzzers.
In this paper, we focus on the up to date research progress on
DGF and conduct the first in-depth study of it. We systemize
the knowledge of DGF by the surveying the state-of-the-art
directed greybox (hybrid) fuzzers and conducting a compre-
hensive analysis based on their assessment. In summary, we
make the following contributions.
- We investigate 26 state-of-the-art fuzzers (80% are pub-
lished after 2019) closely related to DGF, which have
various directed types and optimization techniques. We
extract 15 metrics based on the features of DGF to
conduct a thorough assessment of the collected tools and
systemize the knowledge of this field.
- Base on the assessment of the known works, we summa-
rize six challenges to the research of DGF, including the
binary code support, the automatic target identification,
the differentiated weight metric, the multi-targets rela-
tionship, the missing indirect calls, and the exploration-
exploitation coordination. We disclose the deep reasons
behind these challenges and propose possible solutions to
address them.
- We give perspectives on future research directions, aiming
to facilitate and boost research of this field.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
reviews the background knowledge of greybox fuzzing and
directed greybox fuzzing. Section 3 evaluates the collected
state-of-the-art directed greybox fuzzers based on the extracted
metrics and systemizes the optimization details of each work
for the critical techniques in DGF. Section 4 summarizes
the challenges of this field based on the current research
progress. Section 5 discusses future perspectives and followed
by conclusions.
II. Background
This section provides the background knowledge on CGF
and DGF. We use AFL and AFLGo to illstrate the principle,
respectively. Then we compare DGF with CGF to show the
difference. Finally, we summarize the application scenarios of
DGF.
A. Terminology
To avoid the confusion on the presentation of different
literature, we unify the terminology in fuzzing.
- Fuzzing. In this paper, fuzzing refers to traditional black-
box fuzzing and greybox fuzzing. We exclude whitebox
fuzzing as it depends on constraint solving of symbolic
execution to generate inputs, which is quite different from
evolutionary fuzzers based on mutation.
- Testcase. A testcase is the input to a PUT, which is
generated by randomly mutating a seed.
- Seed. A seed is a testcase that is favored (trigger a new
path or close to the target) and retained for the mutation
to generate new testcases in the next fuzzing iteration.
- Seed prioritization. Seed prioritization means to evaluate
and sort the seeds according to its performance. Priori-
tized seeds would be given more fuzzing chances.
- Power schedule Power schedule means to determine the
number of mutation chances to be applied on a seed (i.e.,
energy).
B. Coverage-guide Greybox Fuzzing
Coverage-guide greybox fuzzing is the most prevalent
fuzzing scheme that aims to maximize the code coverage to
find hidden bugs. AFL (American fuzzy lop) 1 is the state-of-
the-art coverage-based greybox fuzzer, and many state-of-the-
art greybox fuzzers [1, 2, 4, 36] are built on top of it. Here we
use AFL as a representative to illustrate the principle of CGF.
AFL uses lightweight instrumentation to capture basic block
transitions and gain coverage information during runtime.
Then it selects a seed from the seed queue and mutates the
seed to generate testcases. If a testcase exercises a new path,
it is added to the queue as a new seed. AFL favors seeds that
triggered new paths and give them preference over the non-
favored ones. Compared to other instrumented fuzzers, AFL
has a modest performance overhead.
Edge coverage. AFL obtains the execution trace and calcu-
lates the edge coverage by instrumenting the PUT at compile
time. It inserts random numbers for each branch jump at
compile-time and collects these inserted numbers from the
register at run-time to identify the basic block transition (i.e.,
the edge in the CFG), which is calculated by cur location
∧ (prev location >> 1)]. Edge coverage is more delicate
and sensitive than block coverage as it takes into account the
transition between blocks. It is also more scalable than path
coverage as it avoids path explosion. However, this scheme
incurs collision because different edges might have the chance
to share the same identifier.
Seed prioritization. AFL leverages the edge-coverage in-
formation to select seeds. It maintains a seed queue and fuzzes
the seed within it one by one. It labels some seeds as “favored”
when they execute fast and are small in size. AFL uses a
bitmap with edges as keys and top-rate seeds as values to
maintain the best performance seeds for each edge. It selects
favored seeds from the top_rated queue, and gives these
seeds preference over the non-favored ones by giving the
favored one more fuzzing chances [37].
Power schedule. AFL assigns energy to the seed according
to its performance score which is based on coverage (prioritize
inputs that cover more paths), execution time (prioritize inputs
that execute faster), and discovery time (prioritize inputs
discovered later) [38] Particularly, if the test case exercises
a new path, AFL will double the assigned energy.
C. Directed Greybox Fuzzing
In 2017, Bo¨hme et al. introduced the concept of Di-
rected Greybox Fuzzing (DGF) and implemented a tool called
AFLGo [21] based on the modern greybox fuzzing framework.
1http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/
Algorithm 1: Directed Greybox Fuzzing.
Input: i − Initial input
Input: Target − A set of target locations
Output: BugInput − A set of buggy input
01 BugInput ← ∅
02 S eedQueue ← i
03 while true do
04 s← select(S eedQueue)
05 s′ ← mutation(s)
06 trace ← execution(s′)
07 if f ind new path(trace) then
08 S eedQueue ← S eedQueue + s′
09 if trigger crash(trace) then
10 BugInput ← BugInput + s′
11 distance ← evaluation seed(trace, Target)
12 S eedQueue ← sort(S eedQueue, distance)
13 end
Unlike blindly increasing the path coverage in coverage-based
greybox fuzzing, DGF aims to reach a pre-identified location
in the code (potentially the buggy part) and spends most of
its time budget on reaching target locations without wasting
resources stressing unrelated parts.
Here we use AFLGo as the representative to illustrate
how DGF works. AFLGo follows the general principles and
architecture as coverage-guided fuzzing. It relies on compile-
time instrumentation to obtain the current PUT’s running
status, especially the current execution path and path coverage
information. Essentially, the directness in DGF is realized by
prioritizing the seeds that are closer to the targets. However,
the seed prioritization in AFLGo is based on “distance” instead
of new path coverage. The distance is calculated based on
the average of basic blocks on the input seed’s execution
trace weight to the target basic blocks, where the weight is
determined by the number of edges in the call graph and
control-flow graphs of the program. Bo¨hme et al. [1] view
the greybox fuzzing process as a Markov chain that can be
efficiently navigated using a “power schedule”. They leverage
a simulated annealing strategy to gradually assign more energy
to a seed that is “closer” to the targets than to a seed that
is “further away”. They cast reachability as an optimization
problem to minimize the distance of the generated seeds to
the targets.
The exploration-exploitation problem. For DGF, the
whole fuzzing process is divided as the exploration phase
and the exploitation phase [21]. The exploration phase is
designed to uncover as many paths as possible. Like many
coverage-guided fuzzers, DGF in this phase favors the seeds
that cover new paths and prioritizes them. This is because
new paths increase the potential to lead to the targets. It is
particularly necessary when the initial seeds are quite far from
the targets. Then, based on the known paths, the exploitation
phase is invoked to drive the engine to the target code areas.
In this phase, Bo¨hme et al. leverage a simulated annealing-
based power schedule to gradually assign more energy to a
seed that is “closer” to the targets than to a seed that is
“further away”. The intuition is that if the path that the current
seed executes is closer to any of the expected paths that can
reach the target, more mutations on that seed should be more
likely to generate expected seeds that fulfill the target. The
exploration-exploitation tradeoff lies in how to coordinates
these two phases. Bo¨hme et al use a fixed splitting of the
exploration and exploitation phases. For example, for 24-hour
testing, AFLGo uses 20 hours for the exploration and then 4
hours for the exploitation.
D. Difference between CGF and DGF
(1) Seed prioritization. A major difference between CGF
and DGF lies in the seed prioritization. Since CGF aims to
maximize the path coverage, CGF gives preference to seeds
that trigger new paths. Differently, DGF aims to reach specific
locations in the coed. Thus, it prioritizes seeds that are “closer”
to the targets, and the evaluation metrics of the seeds varies a
lot, including distance, coverage, path, and probability.
(2) Target involvement. CGF expands the coverage in an
undirected manner. While for DGF, a set of targets must be
marked in advance, manually or automatically, to guide the
fuzzing process. The target selection can affect the perfor-
mance of DGF. For example, selecting critical sites, such as
memory allocation function malloc() or string manipulation
function strcpy(), as targets are more likely to trigger memory
corruption bugs. Besides, we can leverage the relationship
among targets to accelerate detecting complex behavioral bugs,
such as use-after-free. Thus, the involvement of targets gives
more chance to optimize DGF, and customized techniques that
are specific to DGF can be applied.
(3) Exploration-exploitation. Researchers [37, 39] model
the greybox fuzzing process as a “ multi-armed bandit prob-
lem” where the seeds are considered as arms of a multi-
armed bandit. For coverage-based greybox fuzzing, the whole
process is essentially a tradeoff of the exploration-exploitation
problem, where exploration stands for trying as many seeds
as possible while exploitation means mutating a certain seed
as much as possible. For DGF, the exploration-exploitation
problem lies in coordinating the exploration phase and the
exploitation phase. DGF in the exploration phase favors the
seeds that cover new paths and prioritizes them to increase the
potential to reach the targets. At the same time, the exploitation
phase gives more chances of mutation to seeds that are more
likely to generate inputs to reach the target.
E. Application of DGF
DGF is promising as it is especially suitable and effective
for specific testing scenarios. We summarize the following
common practical application of DGF.
- Patch testing. DGF can be used to test whether a patch
is complete and compatible. A patch is incomplete when
a bug can be triggered by multiple inputs [40], for
example, CVE-2017-15939 is caused by an incomplete
fix for CVE-2017-15023 [41]. Meanwhile, a patch can
introduce new bugs [42]. For example, CVE-2016-5728
is introduced by a careless code update. Thus, directed
fuzzing towards problematic changes or patches has a
higher chance of exposing bugs.
- Bug reproduction. DGF is also useful when reproducing
a known bug without the buggy input. For example, due
to concerns such as privacy, some applications (such as
video player) are not allowed to send the input file. Thus,
the in-house development team can use DGF to reproduce
the crash with the method calls in stack-trace and some
environmental parameters [21]. DGF is also helpful when
generating Proof-of-Concept (PoC) inputs of disclosed
vulnerabilities given bug report information [25, 43]. In
fact, DGF is especially needed because 45.1% of the
usual bug reports cannot be reproduced due to missing
information and users privacy violations [44].
- Knowledge boost. DGF can boost program testing by
integrating the knowledge from a human analyst or
auxiliary techniques. Human-in-the loop is commonly
used in software testing, which can help to identify the
critical syscalls or security-sensitive program sites (e.g.,
memory allocation function malloc(), string manipulation
function strcpy()) based on the previous experience to
guide fuzzing to error-prone parts [35]. Auxiliary tech-
niques, such as symbolic execution [43], tait analysis
[45], static analysis [12], and artificial intelligence [32],
can be leveraged to enhance directedness and overcome
roadblocks in the testing.
- Energy saving. Another interesting application of DGF is
when the testing resource is limited, for example, fuzzing
the IoT devices. Under this circumstance, to save the
time and computational resources spent on non-buggy like
code regions, identifying critical code areas to guide the
testing is more efficient than testing the whole program
in an undirected manner.
- Special bug hunting. Finally, DFG can be applied to
hunting special bugs based on customized indicators. For
example, finding uncontrolled memory consumption bugs
under the guidance of memory usage [31], find use-after-
free bugs under the guidance of typestate violation [28].
With DGF, the efficiency of behavioral complex bugs
discovery can be greatly improved.
III. Assessment of the-state-of-the-artWorks
During the last three years, DGF has drawn the attention of
the whole field, and many followups appear. In this section, we
collect and investigate 26 state-of-the-art fuzzers that relevant
to DGF. To reflect the state-of-the-art research, we choose
to include fuzzers from top-level conferences on security
and software engineering. Alphabetically, ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium (USEC), Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS), and International Conference
on Software Engineering (ICSE). To reflect the most up to
date research progress, we also include works from preprint
website arXiv.org. For writings that appear in other venues
or mediums, we include them based on our own judgment
on their relevance. To conduct a thorough assessment, we
extract 15 metrics based on the features of DGF. We further
divide the metrics into three categories, including basic in-
formation, implementation details, and optimization methods.
In the following, we concentrate on properties that related to
the critical techniques of DGF, including directed type, input
optimization, seed prioritization, power assignment, mutation
scheduling, and data-flow analysis.
A. Directed Type
Although this paper focuses on directed greybox fuzzing
(noted as G in Table I), some of the works we investigated
adopt symbolic execution to enhance the directedness, forming
directed hybrid fuzzing (noted as H), we also include them in
this table.
For the directed type, DGF was initially directed by target
sites that are manually labeled in the PUT, such as AFLGo[21]
and Hawkeye [41]. Then, researchers noticed that the re-
lationship among the targets is also helpful. For example,
in order to trigger use-after-free vulnerabilities, a sequence
of operations (e.g., allocate memory, use memory, and free
memory) must be executed in the specific order. UAFuzz [22]
and UAFL [28] leverages target sequences instead of target
sites to find use-after-free vulnerabilities. LOLLY [23] also
uses target statement sequences to guide greybox fuzzing to
trigger bugs that resulted from the sequential execution of
multiple statements. Berry [24] upgrades LOLLY with hybrid
fuzzing to alleviate the randomness of greybox fuzzing when
reaching deep targets along complex paths. Apart from the
target sequence, researchers have proposed various mecha-
nisms to direct the fuzzing process. Memlock [31] is directed
by memory usage to find uncontrolled memory consumption
bugs. V-Fuzz [32] is directed by vulnerable probability, which
is predicted by a deep learning model to guide the fuzzing
process to potentially vulnerable code area. SemFuzz [25]
and DrillerGo [26] leverage semantic information retrieved
from CVE description and git logs to direct fuzzing and
generate PoC exploits. 1DVUL [43] is directed by patch-
related branches that directly change the original data flow or
control flow to discover 1-day vulnerabilities. SAVIOR [30]
and ParmeSan [29] are directed by information from sanitizers.
IJON [35] leverages annotations from a human analyst to guide
the fuzzer to overcome significant roadblocks. RVFUZZER
[34] is directed by control instability to find input validation
bugs in robotic vehicles. PFUZZER [27] is directed explicitly
at input parser to cover the space of possible inputs well. DGF
has evolved from reaching target locations to hunting complex
deep behavioral bugs,
B. Input Optimization
Once the targets are marked, DGF needs to generate a
seed input to invoke the fuzzing process. A good seed input
can drive the fuzzing process closer to the target location
and improves the performance of the later mutation process.
According to Zong et al., on average, over 91.7% of the
inputs of AFLGo cannot reach the buggy code [51]. Thus,
optimizing the input generation has much room to improve the
directedness of DGF. SeededFuzz[45] focuses on improving
TABLE I
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’17 AFLGo [21] G target sites X × - AFL × × X distance × × × × ×
’17 SemFuzz [25] G Semantic × X - Syzkaller × × X - X X X X ×
’18 Hawkeye [41] G target sites × × - AFL × X X distance × × × X ×
’18 TIFF [46] G bug × × MCB VUzzer × × X - X X X × ×
’19 ProFuzzer [47] G bug × × MCB AFL × × X - X × X X ×
’19 LOLLY [23] G target sequence × × - AFL × × X sequence coverege × × × × ×
’19 V-Fuzz [32] G vulnerable prob-
ability
× × - VUzzer IDA × X fitness score X × × X ×
’19 Wu¨stholz [12] G target sites × × - HARVEY BRAN X X path × × × × ×
’19 Memfuzz [33] G memory access × × - AFL × × X code coverage; new
memory access
× × × × ×
’19 TortoiseFuzz [48] G vulnerable func-
tion
× × MCB AFL × × X function, loop, basic
block
X × X × ×
’19 PFUZZER [27] G parser × × - - X × × × × X X × ×
’19 RVFUZZER [34] G control × × IVB - X × × control instability × × × X ×
’20 RDFuzz [49] G target sites × × - AFL × × X distance; frequency × × × × X
’20 TOFU [50] G target sites × × - - × X X distance × × X X ×
’20 UAFuzz [22] G target sequence × × UAF AFL QEMU × X UAF-based distance;
target similarity;
cut-edge coverage;
X × × × ×
’20 UAFL [28] G typestate × × UAF AFL × × X operation sequence
coverage
X X × X ×
’20 Memlock [31] G memory usage × × MC AFL × × X function & operation
memory consumption
X × × × ×
’20 IJON [35] G human
annotations
X × - AFL × × X × × × × × ×
’20 FuzzGuard [51] G target sites × × - AFLGo × × X distance × × X × ×
’20 ParmeSan [29] G sanitizer checks X × - Angora × X X distance X X X × ×
’20 Ankou [52] G combinatorial
difference
X × - self-AFL × × execution distance × × × × ×
’16 SeededFuzz [45] H critical sites × × - KLEE × × × critical site coverage X × × × ×
’19 DrillerGo [26] H semantic × × - AFL Angr × × × X × × × ×
’19 1DVUL [43] H binary patches × × - Driller QEMU × × diatance × × X × ×
’19 SAVIOR [30] H sanitizer × × OOB,
IOF,
OS
AFL × X X bug potential cover-
age
X × × × ×
’20 Berry [24] H target sequence × × - AFL × × X similarity between the
target execution trace
and the enhanced tar-
get sequence
× × × × ×
* G: greybox fuzzing, H: hybrid fuzzing, UAF: use-after-free, MC: memory consumption, OOB: out-of-boundary, IOF: interger overflow, OS: Oversized
shift, IVB: input validation bug, MCB: memory corruption bug
the generation and selection of initial seeds to achieve the
goal of directed fuzzing. It utilizes dynamic taint analysis
to identify the bytes of seeds which can influence values at
security-sensitive program sites and generates new inputs by
mutating the relative bytes and feeds them to target programs
to trigger errors. FuzzGuard [51] uses a deep-learning-based
approach to filter out unreachable inputs before exercising
them. It views program inputs as a kind of pattern and uses
a large number of inputs labeled with the reachability to the
target code learned from previous executions to train a model.
Then, FuzzGuard utilizes the model to predict the reachability
of the newly generated inputs without running them, which
saves the time spent on real execution.
A fuzzer can perform much better if it generates the input
concerning the input grammar. TOFU [50] takes advantage of
the known structure of the programs inputs in the form of a
protobuf [53] specification to generate valid inputs. TOFU also
augments the input space that it explores to include command-
line flags by dividing the fuzzing process into syntactic-
fuzzing and semantic-fuzzing. However, it usually takes one
or two days to implement input-language grammar even if
the user is familiar with the input language. SemFuzz [25]
leverages information (syscalls and parameters) retrieved from
CVE description and git log to build designed seed inputs to
increases the probability of hitting the vulnerable functions.
TIFF [46] and ProFuzzer [47] identify input types to assist
mutation towards maximizing the likelihood of triggering
memory corruption bugs. PFUZZER [27] is a syntax-driven
approach that specifically targets input parsers to maximize
the input space coverage without generating plausible inputs.
C. Seed Prioritization
The crux of DGF is selecting and prioritizing the seeds
that perform better in directedness under certain metrics. We
summarize three prevalent metrics widely adopted by modern
works, including distance, coverage, and probability.
1) Distance: As we can see from Table I, 35% (9/26) of
the directed fuzzers prioritize seeds based on distance and
give preference to the seeds that are closer to the target. As
a groundbreaking work, AFLGo [21] instruments the source
code at compile-time and calculates the distances to the
target basic blocks by the number of edges in the call graph
and control flow graphs of the program. Then at runtime,
aggregating the distance values of each exercised basic block
to compute an average value to evaluate the seed. Many
followups inherit this method, such as TOFU [50], ParmeSan
[29], and 1DVUL [43] . RDFuzz [49] combines distance with
frequency to prioritize seeds. The code areas are separated
into high-frequency and low-frequency areas by counting the
execution frequency. The inputs are classified into high/low
distance and high/low frequency four types. In the exploration
phase, the low-frequency seeds are prioritized to improve the
coverage, and for the exploitation phase, the low distance seeds
are preferred to achieve the target code areas. UAFuzz is a
tailored directed greybox fuzzer for complex behavioral use-
after-free vulnerabilities [22]. Different from the CFG-based
distance, it uses a distance metric of call chains leading to the
target functions that are more likely to include both allocation
and free functions.
2) Similarity & Coverage: In addition to distance, simi-
larity is another useful metric, which indicates the coverage
of certain target forms, such as functions, locations, and bug
traces. This metric is particularly suitable when there are
many targets. Hawkeye [41] leverages a static analysis of
the PUT and combines the basic block trace distance with
covered function similarity for the seed prioritization and
power scheduling. LOLLY [23] uses a user-specified program
statement sequence as the target and takes the seed’s ability
of covering the target sequences (i.e., sequence coverage) as
a metric to evaluate the seed. UAFL [28] uses the operation
sequence coverage as the feedback to guide the test generation
to progressively cover the operation sequences that are like
to trigger use-after-free vulnerabilities. UAFuzz[22] also uses
a sequenceness-aware target similarity metric to measure the
similarity between the execution of a seed and the target UAF
bug trace. The sequenceness-aware target similarity metric
concretely assesses how many targets a seed execution trace
covers at runtime and takes ordering of the targets into
account. Berry [24] takes into account of the coverage of nodes
in the target sequences and their execution context, and en-
hances the target sequences with necessary nodes, namely the
basic blocks required to reach the nodes in the target sequences
for all paths. In addition to the branch coverage, Berry also
considers the similarity between the target execution trace and
the enhanced target sequence to prioritize the seeds. SAVIOR
[30] prioritizes seeds that have higher potentials to trigger
vulnerabilities based on the coverage of labels predicted by
UBSan [54]. TortoiseFuzz [48] differentiates edges that are
more likely to be destined vulnerable based on the fact that
memory corruption vulnerabilities are closely related to sensi-
tive memory operations. It rioritizes inputs by a combination
of coverige and security impact, which is represented by the
memory operations on three different types of granularity at
function, loop, and basic block.
3) Probability: Probability is a promising metric. V-
Fuzz[32] predicts the vulnerable probability of functions based
on a deep learning-based model and gives each basic block in
the vulnerable function a static score. Then for each input, it
calculates the sum of the static score of all the basic blocks on
its execution path and prioritizes the inputs with higher scores.
The labels made by UBSan in SAVIOR [30] also reflect the
buggy potentials of the corresponding code areas.
4) Path: Wu¨stholz et al [12] prioritize seeds at path level
instead of basic block (edge) level. For each seed, before
added to its test suite, the online static lookahead analysis can
determine a path prefix for which all suffix paths are unable to
reach a target location. In this way, the power schedule of the
fuzzer can allocate its resources more strategically, such that
more effort is spent on exercising program paths that might
reach the target locations.
D. Power Assignment
After the seeds are selected and prioritized, the preferenced
seeds are given more power, namely more mutation chances.
Although power assignment is crucial for DGF, very few
works, try to optimize this step. AFLGo [21] uses a simulated
annealing-based power schedule to gradually assign more
energy to seeds that are closer to the target locations while
reducing energy for further away seeds. Unlike the traditional
random walk scheduling that always accepts better solutions
which may be trapped in local optimum, simulated annealing
accepts the solution which is not as good as the current
one with a certain probability, so it is possible to jump out
of the local optimum and reach the global optimal solution.
[23]. Berry [24] also applies simulated annealing to the seed
energy scheduling scheme to achieve global optimization.
Hawkeye [41] also adopted simulated annealing but added
prioritization. Thus, seeds closer to the target are mutated
first, which further improves the directedness. LOLLY [23]
adopts an optimized simulated annealing-based power sched-
ule to achieve maximum sequence coverage. Controlled by a
temperature threshold, the cooling schedule in the exploration
stage randomly mutates the provided seeds to generate many
new inputs, while in the exploitation stage, it generates more
new inputs from seeds that have higher sequence coverage.
E. Mutation Scheduling
Some fuzzers also optimize mutation strategies to assist
directed fuzzing, which mainly realized by classifying the
mutators into different granularities. Hawkeye[41] leverages an
adaptive mutation strategy, which categorizes the mutators as
coarse-grained and fine-grained. Coarse-grained mutators are
used to change bulks of bytes during the mutations, while fine-
grained only involve a few byte-level modifications, insertions,
or deletions. It gives less chance of coarse-grained mutations
when a seed can reach the target function. Once the seed
reaches targets, the times of doing fine-grained mutations
increase, and coarse-grained mutations decrease. In practice,
the scheduling of mutators is controlled by empirical values.
Similarly, V-Fuzz [32] classify the mutation strategies into
slight mutation and heavy mutation and dynamically adjust
the mutation strategy via a threshold according to the actual
fuzzing states. SemFuzz [25] performs a resemble classifica-
tion, except it focuses on the syscall. SemFuzz utilizes coarse
mutation on the inputs to find a syscall sequence that can
move the execution towards the “vulnerable functions”. After
that, it switches to a fine-grained mutation on the syscall
sequence to monitor the “critical variables”. ProFuzzer [47]
entails different mutation policies according to the input field
types recognized by input type probing.
F. Data-flow Analysis
Compared to control-flow analysis, data-flow analysis is
less prevalent in DGF. This is because it usually enlarges
the runtime overhead even though data-flow analysis helps
optimize mutation strategy and input generation. RDFuzz [49]
leverages a disturb-and-check method to identify and protect
the distance sensitive content from the input, which is vital to
maintain the distance. Preventing such content during mutation
can help to approach the target code location more efficiently.
UAFL [28] adopts an information flow analysis to identify the
relationship between the input and the program variables in the
conditional statement, and assigns higher mutation possibility
for these input bytes with high information flow strength, as
they are more likely to change the values of target statement.
SemFuzz [25] tracks critical variables by the kernel function
parameters that the critical variables depend on via backward
data-flow analysis on the critical variables. SeededFuzz[45]
utilizes dynamic taint analysis to identify the bytes of seeds
which can influence values at security-sensitive program sites.
PFUZZER [27] uses dynamic tainting of inputs to relate each
value processed to the input characters it is derived from. TIFF
[46] infers input type by means of in-memory data-structure
identification and dynamic taint analysis, which increases the
probability of triggering memory corruption vulnerabilities by
type-based mutation.
IV. Challenges and Solutions
In this section, based on the assessment of the state-of-
the-art directed greybox fuzzers, we summarize the following
challenges in DFG and propose potential solutions.
A. Binary Code Support
Most of the known DGF works [21, 41, 49] are implemented
on top of AFL and inherit its compile-time instrumenta-
tion scheme to feedback the execution status or calculate
the distance-based metric. A significant drawback of such a
scheme is the dependence of the PUT source code, which is
unsuitable for testing scenes that the source code is unavail-
able, such as the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software,
or the security-critical programs that rely partly on third-party
libraries.
The binary-level DGF is less prevalent owing to the follow-
ing reasons. First, heavy runtime overhead. A straightforward
solution for the binary code testing is leveraging a full-system
emulator. For example, UAFuzz [22] handles binary codes and
extract execution paths via QEMU. However, emulator-based
tools are usually less efficient. For example, the execution
speed of vanilla AFL is 2X - 5X faster than its QEMU mode
[55]. Second, difficulty in collecting target information. For
source code programs, targets information can be gathered
from various channels, such as the CVE vulnerability de-
scriptions, changes made in the git commit logs, and human
experience on critical sits in the source code. However, for
binary code, we can only extract targets information from bug
trace. Third, difficulty in labeling the targets. For the source
code instrumentation approach, the targets can be labeled from
the source code (e.g., cxxfilt.c, line 100). However, the thing
is much more difficult for the binary-level approach. Since
the binary code is hard to read, we have to disassemble it. A
viable way is processing the binary code with tools such as
IDA Pro [22], then label the target with the virtual address.
However, this is inconvenient and time-consuming.
A viable solution to alleviate the performance limitation
is hardware assistance. Intel PT is a lightweight hardware
feature in recent Intel processors that captures tracing data
about program execution, which replaces the need for dynamic
instrumentation. Intel PT can trace program execution on the
fly with negligible overhead. Using the packet trace captured
by Intel PT along with the corresponding binary of the PUT,
a security analyst could fully reconstruct the PUT’s execution
path. Averagely, the PT-based approach is 4.3x faster than
QEMU-AFL [56]. Previous hardware features such as Intel
Last Branch Record also perform program tracing, but its
output is stored in special registers instead of the main mem-
ory, which limits the trace size. There have been attempts of
CGF with PT, such as kAFL [6], PTfuzz [56], Ptrix [55], and
Honggfuzz [57]. However, PT has never been used to DGF yet.
For the problem of target identification and labeling on binary
code, we can leverage the machine-learning-based approach
[32], or heuristic binary diffing approach to automatically
identify vulnerable code from binary level.
B. Automatic target identification
Most of the known directed fuzzers require the analyst to
mark the targets manually (e.g., AFLGo, Hawkeye). They rely
on the prior knowledge of the target sites, such as the line
number in the source code or the virtual memory address of
the binary code, to label the target and steer the execution
to the desired location [21, 41]. However, to obtain such
prior knowledge is challenging, especially for the binary code.
Among the works we investigated, about a half (12/26) of
them try to optimize the way how the targets are identified.
Researchers use auxiliary metadata, such as changes made
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Fig. 1. Probability bias when measuring the distance.
in the PUT code based on git commit logs[25], information
extracted from bug trace [22], or information from CVE
vulnerability descriptions [26] to gather interesting targets.
Nevertheless, it still relies on manual efforts to process the
information and mark the target on the PUT. It is unsuitable
when fuzzing a PUT for the first time or when well-structured
information is unavailable.
To achieve automatic target identification, we can use static
analysis tools to find potential dangerous areas in the PUT
[45, 58, 59]. However, these tools are often specific to the bug
types and programming languages used [29]. Another direction
is leveraging the compiler sanitizer passes, such as UBSan
[54], to annotate potential bugs in the PUT [29, 30]. For
bytecode, 1DVUL [43] identifies patch-related target branches
by extracting different functions as well as their different basic
blocks through binary-level comparison based on Bindiff. A
deep learning-based method is also effective in predicting the
vulnerability and uses the prediction information to guide the
fuzzing [32]. Finally, attack surface identification component
[60] can also be used to identify vulnerable targets for DGF
automatically.
C. Differentiated weight metric
In most of the state-of-the-art directed greybox fuzzers,
the prioritization of seeds is based on equal-weight metrics.
Take the widely used distance-based metric as an example.
The ability to reach the target is measured by the distance
between the seed and the target. Specifically, the distance
between the seed and target is represented by a number of
edges, namely the transitions among basic blocks. However,
such measurement ignores the fact that different branch jumps
have different probabilities to take. Thus, it is inaccurate and
potentially limits the performance of the directed fuzzing.
We use the following example to illustrate the difference.
Figure 1 shows a CFG fragment, in which the input x is
an integer ranges from 0 to 9. It is easy to know that the
probability of jumping from node A to node C is 0.1, and from
node A to node B is 0.9. We can also obtain the probabilities
of other jumps by the branch conditions. For the distance
calculation based on the number of branch jumps, the distance
of A→ C is shorter than that of A → G. This is because A →
C has only one jump but A → G has three jumps. However,
when we take the branch jump probability into account, the
probability of A → C is 0.1. However, the probability of A →
G is 0.9 × 0.7 × 0.5 ≈ 0.3, which is more likely to be taken
than A → C and should be considered as has a “shorter”
distance. Thus, it is more reasonable to consider the weight
difference as well when calculating the distance to guide the
seed prioritization. The rationale of the coverage-based metric
is the same.
One possible solution is taking the branch jump probability
into account. When evaluating the reachability of the target
based on probability, each seed is prioritized based on how
likely the seed can generate an input that can reach the target,
namely the probability of converting the current execution path
of this seed to a target path that goes through the target.
Since an execution path can be viewed as a Markov Chain
of successive branches [1], therefore, the probability of a path
can be calculated based on the probabilities of all the branches
within the path, and the estimation works by statistically
calculating the ratio of branches traverse this path.
A Monte Carlo based method can be leveraged to estimate
such probability. The density of the stationary distribution
formally describes the likelihood that the fuzzer exercises a
certain path after a certain number of iterations. A Monte
Carlo based method requires two conditions: 1) the sampling
should be random; 2) the sample scale should be large [3].
Fortunately, the fuzzing process by nature fulfills these require-
ments. The execution paths motivated by randomly mutated
testcases can be considered as random samples, which met the
first requirement. The high throughput of the testcases gener-
ated by fuzzers makes the estimation statistically meaningful,
satisfying the second requirement. Thus, regarding fuzzing as
a sampling process, we can statistically estimate the branch
jump probability in a lightweight fashion.
One possible drawback of such a probability-based ap-
proach is the potential run-time overhead. Both the statisti-
cal jump counting and probability calculation can introduce
extra computation. A simple way to alleviate performance
deduction is interval sampling. Another possible solution is to
accelerate the computation, which involves how the metadata
is stored and accessed. Conventionally, graph-based data is
stored in an adjacency table. However, since the probability-
based approach updates the jump statistics very often and the
reachability judgment also requires a quick edge tracing, thus,
the adjacency table is unsuitable owing to the less efficiency
when accessing data. Another option is the adjacency matrix
[48], which supports quick data access. However, since a
jump usually has two branches, the matrix is vast, while the
data distribution is relatively sparse, which increases space
consumption dramatically. Thus, a pre-condition to leverage
a probability-based approach is designing a customized data
structure that balances the time complexity and space com-
plexity.
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Fig. 2. Global distance bias.
D. Multi-targets relationship
When there are multi-targets in a DGF testing, How to co-
ordinates these targets is another challenge. If these targets are
unrelated, one strategy is seeking the global shortest distance
based on Dijkstras algorithm, as AFLGo does. However, such
global optimization can miss the local optimum seed that is
closest to a certain target, leading to a deviation. We use the
following example to illustrate the situation.
Figure 2 shows an execution tree, where node I, P, L are the
target nodes. If the execution path is A→C→F→J→N, based
on the distance formula defined in AFLGo [21], the distance
between the path and the targets are: dI = 3, dP = (4 + 3 +
2 + 1) / 4 = 2.5, dL = (3 + 2) / 2 = 2.5. Thus, the global
distance dglobal = 3 + 2.5 + 2.5 = 8. If the execution path is
A→B→D→I, the distance for the targets are: dI = (3 + 2 + 1
+ 0) / 4 = 1.5, dP = 4, dL = 3, and dglobal = 1.5 + 4 + 3 = 8.5.
According to the algorithm, path A→C→F→J→N who has a
shorter global distance should be prioritized. However, this is
inreasonable because path A→B→D→I goes through a target
node I, which has a better directness and should be prioritized.
Therefore, when there are multiple targets, the method of
finding the global shortest distance has deviation, which affect
the directness of fuzzing. Another strategy is separating the
targets. For each seed, only selecting the minimum distance
among all the targets as the distance of the seed, and prioritize
the seed based on this distance [43]. In this way, we can avoid
the local optimum deviation, but this might slow down the
speed of reaching a specific target.
For the situation that multi-targets are related, such as the
stack trace of reproducing a known bug [23], we should also
take into account the relationships among targets, such as the
ordering [22] and execution context [24].
E. Missing Indirect Calls
No matter what metric is adopted, DGF relies on control-
flow analysis to prioritize the seed. Take the distance-based
metric as an example, in order to prioritize the seeds that
are close to the targets, the distance is generally measured
based on the control-flow graph and call graph. However, most
researchers construct the control-flow graph and call graph
statically from the source code at compile-time via LLVMs
builtin APIs, such graphs are incomplete due to the missing
of indirect calls. In real-world programs, indirect function calls
are prevalent. For example, in libpng, 44.11% function calls
are indirect function calls [41]. For static analysis without
running the program, indirect function calls sites cannot be
observed directly from the source code or binary instructions,
such as passing a function pointer as a parameter in C or
using function objects and pointers. For binary code, the
target address of indirect calls depends on the values in
the registers, which cannot be obtained either. Besides, to
construct an inter-procedural control-flow graph, we need to
combine the control-flow graph of each function generated
based on LLVMs IR with the call graph of the whole program.
Therefore, the distance measurement based on the call graph
and control-flow graph is inaccurate without the indirect calls,
which affects the ability of DGF to reach the targets.
For static approaches, one straightforward solution to this
challenge is performing Andersen’s points-to analysis for
function pointers [30, 41]. However, such inclusion-based
context-insensitive pointer analysis causes an indirect call to
have many outgoing edges, possibly yielding execution paths
that are not possible for a given input. TOFU [50] uses
function type-signatures to approximate the callable set at
each indirect-call site. However, it does not consider casts,
which could allow a differently typed function to be called,
introducing imprecision. For the dynamic situation, ParmeSan
[29] identifies the missing edges of indirect calls during real
executions and compensates the call graph gradually. Finally,
the graphs tend to be complete after enough number of fuzzing
executions. However, such a solution inevitably enlarges the
run-time overhead and cannot guarantee completeness.
F. Exploration-exploitation coordination
The last challenge for DGF lies in coordinating the
exploration-exploitation tradeoff. On the one hand, more ex-
ploration can obtain and provide adequate information for the
exploitation; on the other hand, an overfull exploration would
occupy many resources and delay the exploitation. It is difficult
to determine the boundary between the exploration phase and
the exploitation phase. Namely, we do not know when to
stop exploration and begin the exploitation can perform the
best. AFLGo adopts a fixed separation of the exploration
and exploitation phases. The time budgets are set in the test
configuration before testing, which is empirical and inflexible.
Such a scheme is preliminary because the separation point is
empirical and inflexible. Since different PUT has a different
character, such fixed separation is less adaptive. Once the
exploration phase turns to the exploitation phase, there is no
going back even if the direction performance is poor due to
not enough paths.
To illustrate how the splitting of the exploration and ex-
ploitation phases affects the performance of DGF, we use the
“-z” parameter of AFLGo to set different time budget for the
exploration phase and compare the performance. As figure 3
 0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
AFLGo-1
AFLGo-2
AFLGo-4
AFLGo-8
AFLGo-12
AFLGo-16
AFLGo-20
AFLGo-22
Fig. 3. Comparison of different splitting of exploration and exploitation.
shows, the horizontal coordinate shows the time duration, and
the vertical coordinate means the minimum input among all
the generated inputs to the target code distance areas. A small
min distance indicates a better-directed performance. The
experiments last for 24 hours, and AFLGo-1 means 1 hour of
exploration, 23 hours of exploitation, and the rest are similar.
From the result, we can conclude that the splitting of the
exploration and exploitation phases affects the performance of
DGF, and the best performance (AFLGo-16) requires adequate
time for both of the two phases. However, it is difficult to get
optimum splitting.
Among the directed fuzzers we investigated, only one
work improves the coordination of exploration-exploitation.
RDFuzz [49] uses an intertwined schedule to conduct explo-
ration and exploitation alternately. It counts the branch-level
statistics during the execution to separate the code areas into
high-frequency and low-frequency areas. Based on the two
evaluation criteria of frequency and distance, the inputs are
classified into high/low distance and high/low-frequency types.
Low-frequency inputs are helpful to improve the coverage,
which is required in the exploration; Low distance inputs are
helpful to achieve the target code areas, which are favored in
the exploitation. Finally, it uses an intertwined testing schedule
to conduct the exploration and exploitation alternately.
Another possible solution to this challenge is leveraging
a dynamic strategy to coordinate the exploration-exploitation
phases, which can adaptively switch between the exploration
phase and the exploitation phase. To realize this scheme, we
can utilize a variable to coordinate the energy we spend on
each phase. We call this variable depth, which indicates the
percentage of energy that spends on the exploitation phase.
Based on this design, an adaptive DGF should start from the
exploration phase (depth = 0) that focuses on discovering new
paths. Then, with the increasing of known paths, we gradually
increase depth to invoke the exploitation phase, in which high-
valued directed seeds are selected and prioritized to enhance
the reachability base on depth. When the fuzzer can not find
any new paths for amount of time, this means the exploration
phase has come to the bottleneck, and we should quickly move
to the exploitation phase by dramatically increasing depth.
Similarly, we also need to move from the exploitation phase
back to the exploration phase occasionally. For example, the
generation of the directed seed is very low for many fuzzing
cycles. We should move back to the exploration phase to
enlarge known path coverage to discover more directed seeds.
When we are already at the exploitation phase and depth
is very large (e.g., depth > 0.9), but we still cannot find
any new paths for many fuzzing cycles, we should decrease
depth dramatically. This is because the currently directed seeds
perform poorly, and we need to move back to the exploration
phase to find new directed seeds. With this scheme, both of
the two phases can coexist. Thus, they can achieve the best
performance and adaptiveness.
V. Discussion
According to Table I, 80% (21/26) of the works were
published after 2019, indicating that DGF is currently a
research hotspot. With the rapid development of DGF, apart
from target sites, various of indicators have been proposed
to direct DGF, including target sequence [22–24], semantic
information [25, 26], typestate [28], sanitizer checks [29, 30],
memory usage [31], and vulnerable probability [32]. DGF has
evolved from reaching target locations to hunting complex
deep behavioral bugs, such as used-after-free bugs [22, 28],
memory consumption bugs [31], memory violation bugs [33],
and deep stateful bugs [35].
A. Relationship among Targets
Although 85% (22/26) of the directed fuzzers we investi-
gated support multi-targets, only 4 of them pay attention to the
relationship among targets. When there are multiple targets,
we need to figure out the relationship among them. If they are
unrelated, we can assign weights to them to differentiate the
importance or probability. Otherwise, the hidden relationship
can be extracted and exploited to improve directedness. For ex-
ample, UAFL [28] take into account of the operation sequence
ordering when leverages target sequence to find use-after-
free vulnerabilities. This is because, to trigger such behavioral
complex vulnerabilities, one needs not only to cover individual
edges but also to traverse some long sequence of edges in
a particular order. Berry [24] enhances the target sequences
with execution context (i.e., necessary nodes, which are basic
blocks required to reach the nodes in the target sequences) for
all paths. We propose the following relationships that can be
further included.
- Spatial relationship. The relative position of targets on
the execution tree. Suppose we have two targets, we can
measure them by whether they are on the same execution
path, how many execution paths are shared by them, and
which one is the ancestor or the successor of the other.
- State relationship. For targets that involve the program
state, we also need to consider their position in the state
space. For example, whether two targets share the same
states, and whether two states can convert to each other
on the state transition map.
- Interleaving relationship. For multi-threaded programs,
the thread scheduling affects the execution ordering of
events in different threads. Targets that can be reached
under the same thread interleaving should be a close
relationship in the interleaving space.
Based on the above discussion, we recommend taking the
relationship among targets when selecting and prioritizing
targets. The targets with higher reachability should have higher
priority. Targets with a closer relationship should be covered
with fewer test runs.
B. Technology Integration
Owing to the fact that DGF depends on the randommutation
to generate test inputs, it can hardly reach deep targets and is
less effective at triggering deep bugs along complex paths. In
order to enhance the directedness and the reachability to corner
cases and flaky bugs, various program analysis techniques
such as static analysis, taint analysis, artificial intelligence,
and symbolic execution have been adopted. Static analysis
can be leveraged to automatically identify targets [30], extract
information from PUT [12, 41]. Taint analysis can be used
to identify the relationship between the input and the critical
program variables and optimize mutation strategy scheduling
cite [28, 45]. Artificial intelligence can help to predict vulner-
able code [32] and filter out unreachable inputs [51]. Symbolic
(concolic) execution can be leveraged to solve complex path
constraints. Directed hybrid fuzzing is a promising direction
that can leverage both the precision of symbolic execution and
the scalability of DGF to mitigate their individual weaknesses.
Directed fuzzing can prioritize and schedule input mutation
to get closer to the targets rapidly, and directed symbolic
execution can help reach deeper code guarded by complex
checks on the execution traces from program entry to the
targets [24, 26, 30, 43]. Nevertheless, we should be aware
that anti-fuzzing techniques [62, 63] can insert fake paths, add
delays in error-handling code, and obfuscate codes to slow
down dynamic analyses such as symbolic execution and taint
analysis [48].
C. Implementation Limitation
According to Table I, about 57% (15/26) of the tools are
implemented on top of AFL. Thus, the performance is, to some
extent, limited by the implementation of AFL. We illustrate
such limitation from two aspects.
Since the edge coverage of AFL is based on the basic block
transitions, thus, it is only sensitive at the basic block level and
cannot distinguish the path difference at the instruction level.
Figure 4 shows an example of a jump between two nearby
basic blocks. Since a traditional CFG is only path-sensitive at
the basic block level, we cannot differentiate whether the jump
at address 0x400657 is taken (path 2) or not (path 1) because
there will be the same edge in the CFG, namely 0x400657→
400671. Thus, such CFG is not sensitive enough to precisely
reflect the code coverage at the instruction level.
Another problem lies in the path collision. AFL inserts
random numbers for each branch jump at compile-time and
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Fig. 4. Differentiate execution path at instruction level.
collects these inserted numbers from the register at run-time
to identify the basic block transition (i.e., the edge in the
CFG). Then it maps such transitions to a 64KB bitmap by
cur location ∧ (prev location >> 1)]. This scheme incurs
path collision because different edges might have the chance
to share the same location.
Both of the two limitations of AFL can cause imprecision
on the control-flow graph, which eventually affect the seed
prioritization based on the control-flow graph, no matter it is
based on distance or other metrics. Although such limitation
can be alleviated by constructing finer-grained control-flow
graph or designing a customized hash scheme [61], however,
this inevitably increase the runtime overhead. Thus, the imple-
mentation is essentially a tradeoff between the effectiveness
and the efficiency. Such limitation from implementation level
also exists in other tools.
D. Efficiency Improvement
In order to realize directedness in fuzzing, most researchers
use additional instrumentation and data analysis, for example,
by static analysis, symbolic execution, taint analysis, and
machine learning. However, such additional analysis inevitably
incurs performance deduction. For the evaluation, researchers
usually focus on the ability to reach targets, using metric
such as Time-to-Exposure (the length of the fuzzing campaign
until the first testcase that exposes a given error [21]) to
measure the performance of directed greybox fuzzers, while
ignoring the run-time overhead. However, for a given fuzzing
time budget, higher efficiency means more fuzzing executions
and consequently, more chance to reach the target. Thus,
optimize fuzzing efficiency is another direction to improve the
directedness.
One solution is moving the execution-independent compu-
tation from run-time to compile-time. For example, AFLGo
measures the distance between each basic block and a tar-
get location by parsing the call graph and intra-procedure
control flow graph of the PUT. Since both parsing graphs
and calculating distances are very time consuming, AFLGo
moves most of the program analysis to the instrumentation
phase at compile-time in exchange for efficiency at run-time.
Another optimization is at the implementation level. Since
most of the data we use during the analysis is graph-based,
how such metadata is stored and accessed is vital to the
efficiency. We can design an optimized data structure to store
such data, which should facilitate the frequent and quick access
to the data when searching based on the topological structure
of the graphfor example, using the graph database model
[64]. Finally, we can leverage parallel computing to improve
efficiency further. Prior works [65, 66] have successfully
applied parallelism to CGF. For DGF, we can use a central
node to maintain a seed queue that holds and prioritizes all
the seeds for DGF. Then, distributing the seeds to parallel
fuzzing instances on computational nodes to test the PUT and
collect feedback information.
E. Future research suggestions
Based on the assessment and analysis of known works, we
point the following directions for future research.
- Among the tools we evaluated, only one (SemFuzz [25])
of them supports kernel code testing. Thus, introducing
DGF to kernel code and guiding fuzzing towards critical
sites such as syscalls [67] and error handling codes [68,
69] should be a workable direction.
- Although DGF has been trying to discover new bug
types, such as use-after-free and memory consumption
bugs, many commonly seen bugs have not been included
yet. Thus, another research direction is applied DGF to
specific bug types, such as information leakage bugs,
concurrency bugs, semantic bugs (TOCTTOU, double
fetch [42]).
- As for the seed prioritization metric, most of the works
leverage distance and coverage (similarity) based meth-
ods, which facilitate quantitive seed evaluation without
introducing much overhead. However, a smaller distance
or broader coverage does not necessarily mean closer to
the target owing to the unequal weight reason (discussed
in detail in Section IV-C). We argue that path and
probability-based metrics should be more reasonable.
- Finally, staged fuzzing [50, 70] is also a feasible approach
that can be further exploited for DGF. By dividing the
path to the target into sequential stages, staged directed
fuzzing can get to the target step by step by reaching
the sub-targets in each stage. Moreover, we can leverage
different fuzzing strategies to satisfy the requirements
in different stages. For example, TOFU uses syntactic-
fuzzing for command-line flags and semantic-fuzzing for
primary input files. Thus, staged fuzzing can reduce the
dimensionality of the input space for each individual stage
of fuzzing and improve fuzzing efficiency.
VI. Conclusions
Directed greybox fuzzing is a practical and scalable ap-
proach to software testing under specific scenarios, such as
patch testing and bug reproduction. The modern DGF has
evolved from reaching target locations to hunting complex
deep behavioral bugs. In this paper, we conduct the first in-
depth study of directed greybox fuzzing. We collect 26 state-
of-the-art directed greybox (and hybrid) fuzzers with various
directed schemes and optimization techniques. Based on the
feature of DGF, we extract 15 metrics to conduct a thorough
assessment of the collected tools and systemize the knowledge
of this field. Based on the assessment, we summarize the
challenges and perspectives of this field, aiming to facilitate
and boost future research on this topic.
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